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Abstract. This paper aims at connecting democratic theory with civic technolo-
gies in order to highlight the links between some theoretical tensions and tri-
lemmas and design trade-offs. First, it reviews some tensions and ‘trilemmas’ 
raised by political philosophers and democratic theorists. Second, it considers 
both the role and the limitations of civic technologies in mitigating these ten-
sions and trilemmas. Third, it proposes to adopt a meso-level approach, in be-
tween the macro-level of democratic theories and the micro-level of tools, to 
situate the interplay between people, digital technologies, and data. 
Keywords: Democracy, civic technologies, representation, participation, delib-
eration, linked democracy.  
1 Introduction 
Over the last two decades, digital technologies have opened up new paths for civic 
engagement and political participation. Hundreds of websites, portals, platforms and 
mobile apps enable citizens across the globe to organise campaigns, vote initiatives 
and sign petitions, monitor their representatives and track parliamentary activity, pro-
pose ideas and draft legislation or constitutions. Governments at different levels adopt 
digital technologies to develop ‘open government’ and ‘open data’ strategies to pro-
mote citizens’ participation and increase transparency. Crowdsourcing is now a per-
vasive method to collect data, information, ideas, and legislative proposals. A grow-
ing literature based on case studies and empirical testing provides the basis for further 
refinement of methods: e.g. smart crowdsourcing (Noveck 2015), expert crowdsourc-
ing (Kim et al. 2014, Griffith et al. 2017), microtasking (Luz et al. 2015).  
The exploration of new technologies and methods to harness the potential of 
crowdsourcing for civic action and politics, nevertheless, contrasts with the scarce 
attention given to the underlying assumptions about democracy, participation, equali-
ty, representation, and citizenship. Surprisingly enough, there has been little dialogue 
between theorists of democracy and citizenship, on the one hand, and digital technol-
ogists, information systems and AI experts, on the other, on how civic technologies 
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may redefine our current notions of democracy, participation, equality, representation, 
and citizenship.  
Our goal in this paper is threefold. First, we aim to induce a discussion on how to 
reinterpret some of these notions by reviewing some tensions and ‘trilemmas’ raised 
by political philosophers and democratic theorists. Second, we consider both the role 
and the limitations of civic technologies in mitigating these tensions and trilemmas. 
Third, we propose to adopt a meso-level approach, in between the macro-level of 
democratic theories and the micro-level of tools, to situate the interplay between peo-
ple, digital technologies, and data. As different groups in different social contexts use 
digital tools and data differently, it is at this meso level that we can elucidate the 
trade-offs with the notions of the trilemmas. We conceptualise the meso-level as the 
institutional level, for the notion of institution will give us a framework to analyse the 
use of technology in a given social context. 
2 Some Tensions and ‘Trilemmas’ in Democratic Theory 
2.1 A Condorcetian Reading of Representation 
The tensions between key concepts in democratic theory, notably sovereignty, repre-
sentation, participation, equality, and citizenship have long been debated. In her work 
on representative democracy, Nadia Urbinati has noted that both Montesquieu and 
Rousseau were ‘the first theorists to argue (for divergent reasons) that an unsolvable 
tension exists between democracy, sovereignty, and representation’ (2004: 54). More 
specifically:  
 
Montesquieu separated representation from democracy, and Rousseau representation from 
sovereignty. Montesquieu argued that a state where the people delegated their ‘right of sov-
ereignty’ could not be democratic and must be classified as a species of mixed government 
and in fact an aristocracy. Rousseau saw such a state as non-political from the start and ille-
gitimate because the people lost their political liberty along with the power to vote on legis-
lation directly: unless all citizens were lawmakers, there were no citizens at all. In both cas-
es, democracy and sovereignty excluded representation (idem). 
 
Urbinati argues that this exclusion remains implicit within contemporary theories 
of representative government for which “from a theoretical point of view, a ‘repre-
sented democracy’, although technically feasible, is an oxymoron, while direct de-
mocracy, although the norm, is impractical” (2004: 55). Yet, Urbinati denies this 
incompatibility to be the only legacy of 18th century’s political philosophy when it 
comes to the idea of representation.
1
 In supporting her claim for a ‘democratic under-
                                                          
1 ‘Rather than a monolithic entity, the theory of representative government formed, since its 
birth, a complex and pluralistic family whose democratic wing was not the exclusive property 
of those who advocated for participation against representation.’ (Urbinati 2004: 55). 
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standing of representation’ she draws on Condorcet’s Plan de Constitution submitted 
to the French National Assembly in 1793. Condorcet’s proposal, eventually rejected 
by both his fellow Girondins and the Jacobins, contains what Urbinati describes as ‘an 
institutional order that is one of the most democratically advanced and imaginative 
Europe has produced in the last two centuries’ (2004: 56): 
 
Condorcet’s constitution designed a political order that was horizontal and acephalous (par-
liamentary, not presidential) and rigorously based on the centrality of the legislative power, 
a power held by a multiplicity of actors and performed in multiple times and within a plural-
ity of spaces. The function of legislation was performed within assemblies – elected assem-
bly and assemblies of the citizens (assemblées primaires) – and was held by the representa-
tives along with (not instead of) the citizens who ‘enjoyed’ both the electoral right and the 
right to revoke or censure the laws (constitutional and ordinary). (2004: 59-60).   
 
Condorcet, Urbinati notes, reconciles sovereignty, representation, and participation 
by making ‘citizens’ participation essential to both the functioning of representative 
government and the preservation of political liberty’ (2004: 60). With a comment that 
echoes Josiah Ober’s vision of the role of citizens in ancient Athens (2008, 2015), 
Urbinati sees citizen participation in Condorcet’s institutional order as a ‘source of 
stability and of innovation’, while representation becomes the political device collect-
ing and filtering knowledge for the public interest (2004: 60).  
In our contemporary democracies, representation has become an even more intri-
cate subject, even at the local level (Ng et al. 2016). Urbinati and Warren argue that 
the complexity of issues and the multiple, overlapping constituencies involved call for 
the extension of the meaning of representation to include non-electoral forms ‘that are 
capable of representing latent interests, transnational issues, broad values, and discur-
sive positions’ (Urbinati and Warren 2009: 407). Moreover, the Internet has also ena-
bled the emergence of online communities of interest beyond geographical boundaries 
that have no mechanisms of representation in our political systems (Lloyd 2017). 
It is our contention that digital technologies and AI can facilitate the channelling of 
these multifaceted forms of representation in unique ways. But a second ‘trilemma’ 
needs to be addressed before considering these options. 
2.2 The ‘Trilemma’ of Democratic Reform 
James Fishkin, a leading theorist of deliberative democracy, addresses in one of his 
papers the key question of how to incorporate public deliberation into constitutional 
processes (Fishkin 2011). In raising this question he introduces what he refers to as 
the ‘trilemma of democratic reform’. To Fishkin, there are three basic principles in-
ternal to the design of democratic institutions: political equality (people’s views are 
counted equally), mass participation (we are all given the opportunity to provide in-
formed consent), and deliberation (we are all given the opportunity to provide opin-
ions and weigh competing arguments).  
Fishkin suggests that, under normal conditions, any serious effort to attain any of 
the two principles inevitably hinders the third, so that we cannot satisfy the three prin-
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ciples simultaneously. For example, if we pursue a process driven by political equali-
ty and mass participation we are unlikely to get deliberation into the picture because 
the incentives for people to become seriously informed and engaged are very low 
(‘audience democracy’). Likewise, we can satisfy the principles of political equality 
and deliberation if we choose (by lot or by random sampling) a microcosm of deliber-
ators (e.g. Fishkin’s Deliberative Polls). This microcosm may be representative of the 
broader population from which it has been extracted, but then this population will 
have no voice in the process and therefore the principle of mass participation will not 
be fulfilled. Finally, we can have a process with mass participation (to some extent) 
and deliberation. This is what most of the current online crowd-civic platforms pro-
vide, but what we gather in this case is a ‘self-selected microcosm of deliberators’, 
highly engaged and yet, far from being representative of the broader population (so 
we would be violating the principle of political equality). Tanja Aitamurto et al. 
(2014) have also highlighted the tension between the norm of equal representation in 
democracy and the self-selection bias of crowdsourcing, suggesting that ‘crowdsourc-
ing shouldn’t strive for statistical representativeness of the public, otherwise the vir-
tues of crowdsourcing would be compromised and its benefits in crowd work would 
not be achieved.’ (2014: 1). Statistical representativeness as a requirement may be a 
debatable issue, but what is at stake here is the legitimacy of crowdsourcing in politi-
cal practice. We also find a self-selection bias in offline political activity, e.g. in par-
liamentary elections, where the turnout is usually significantly below 100 per cent of 
the demos. How self-selection affects legitimacy in a political process is a general 
issue that political theory needs to address in broader terms. Specifically, if we con-
ceptualize political equality in the classical sense [isegoria (equal voice) + isonomia 
(equality of political rights)] self-selection does not necessarily diminish the principle 
of equality (non-participation is an individual decision). 
What should we do if the simultaneous achievement of the three principles is not 
attainable? Fishkin suggests adopting a pragmatic approach to solve his trilemma. 
Rather than trying to approximate the ideal, he proposes the design of a second best 
approach or a proxy (and hence his research program on Deliberative Polling, aiming 
at both the internal and external validity of the process). Nevertheless, Fishkin 
acknowledges that this solution may incur a democratic deficit, since the resulting 
views may not be the actual views of the public (2011: 253). To tackle this issue, he 
proposes a process with sequential strategies (for example, a convention followed by 
a deliberative microcosm and, finally, a referendum) that, combined, cover the three 
principles at different stages.  
The remaining issue, nevertheless, is that deliberation does not travel well across 
those stages. Fishkin illustrates what he terms ‘the weak link of deliberation’ with the 
example of the Australian 1999 referendum, where two different deliberative bodies 
(a convention and a deliberative poll) had previously reached the opposite conclusion 
(pro-republic) with regard to the proposal of an Australian republic (2011: 253-254). 
The elaboration of Iceland’s Constitution is another recent example of the weak con-
nection between deliberative bodies (in this case, the Constitutional Convention and 
the Parliament). Fishkin proposes to strengthen this link by organizing a Deliberation 
Day, where the entire population is convened for one day to engage in deliberation 
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followed by a referendum. To motivate participants, Fishkin estimated that an incen-
tive of $300 per participant would act as an adequate incentive (2011: 258). No matter 
how well designed, though, the costs of such events could be extremely prohibitive 
for many countries, especially considering how short-lived they would be. The ques-
tion that remains open is whether there is a role for technology in mitigating the tri-
lemma.  
3 Mitigating Democratic Trilemmas 
Political philosophy addresses both the tensions and trilemmas in democratic theory 
and practice with a sophisticated conceptual apparatus. Yet, research on the implica-
tions of civic technologies for democracy and democratisation processes is still large-
ly overlooked in both deliberative and epistemic accounts of democracy. This com-
partmentalisation of knowledge is disadvantageous from both a theoretical and empir-
ical perspective. For example, enabling effective non-electoral forms of representation 
would require a survey of technology options and ‘knowledge of what works and 
when’ (Noveck 2017). Likewise, a better understanding of the underlying principles, 
models, and concepts of democratic theory would help to inform the design of civic 
tools and modulate the frequently inflated expectations placed on them.  
Digital platforms facilitate the depth and breadth of participation, lowering the bar-
riers to different forms of participation (without precluding offline participation) and 
improving the ‘open access pattern’ of a given social order (North et al. 2009). They 
also open up the door to new, meaningful forms of mass deliberation and epistemic 
outcomes (e.g. Klein 2015, Luz et al. 2015, Theocharis and van Deth 2016). To illus-
trate this point, in Figures 1 and 2 below we compare two models of democracy: 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Plebiscitarian model with deliberative 
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Fig. 2. Participatory model with deliberative body 
Fig. 1 represents a well-known plebiscitarian model of democracy: a small group (for 
example, a constitutional convention, a parliamentary commission, etc.) produces a 
legal text. When the text is ready, a referendum is called and citizens can cast a yes/no 
vote. This model accounts for the principles of political equality, mass participation, 
and representation. Yet, deliberation is restricted to the small group, as citizens are 
left with just an ex post, binary option (yes/no). Many constitution making processes 
in Western democracies have followed this path to date.  
Fig. 2 visualises a more complex participatory model to mitigate the trilemma. As 
in the previous case, a small group of people (either drafted by sortition or appointed 
by some other entity) is given the task of producing a legal text, but in sequential 
steps. The group deliberates on a first draft, which is open to the general public for 
comments and suggestions (typically from a self-selected subset of the electorate). 
The feedback from this very large group is incorporated in the draft and subsequently 
adapted to produce, after a number of iterations, the text to be agreed and ratified by 
the electorate. This participatory model was famously deployed in Iceland in 2011, 
when the meetings and debates of a Constitutional Council of 25 individuals (drafted 
from a larger pool of citizens) were made publicly available in the Council website 
for comment via social media and e-mail. The proposal was approved by a two-thirds 
majority of the voting population in a referendum in late 2012 but it eventually stalled 
in parliament (Landemore 2017).  
Similarly, this model was adopted in Mexico City. On January 2016, the Mayor of 
the city obtained approval from the federal parliament to initiate a constitution-
making process by appointing a group of 30 experts to discuss and draft a proposal.
2
 
In order to open up the drafting process to the citizenry, the City Council made pub-
licly available a collaborative editing tool for citizens to provide feedback on the spe-
cific topics posted by the drafting group. Moreover, as crowdsourced legal drafting 
does not typically attract a large number of citizens, this approach was complemented 
                                                          
2 https://www.constitucion.cdmx.gob.mx/constitucion-cdmx/#grupo-trabajo 
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with other participatory strategies, namely a survey and a Change.org campaign to 
collect petitions relevant to the constitutional text (at the closing date of the process, 
280,678 people had supported 129 petitions). The Constitution of Mexico City was 
finally published on 5 February 2017, although at the time of writing the Supreme 
Court of Mexico is hearing a number of appeals to the constitutional text from the 
federal government, two political parties, and other organisations.
3
 Strikingly, both 
the Icelandic and Mexican constitutional drafts came to a standstill as other institu-
tional bodies were involved. We will review this in Section 3.2 below. 
3.1 The Technology Caveat 
Digital platforms have come a long way when it comes to facilitating legal drafting, 
crowdsourcing of ideas, or structuring large-scale deliberation, but the tasks of aggre-
gating legal and political knowledge for deliberation and decision making remain 
onerous. In recent years, a number of advances in AI areas such as text mining, argu-
ment detection, extraction, and mapping can be applied to support the activity of very 
large groups, both to improve self awareness (of what they are co-producing) and 
facilitate knowledge aggregation. Likewise, both small and large groups can benefit 
from text mining, semantic languages (e.g. RDF, XML), ontologies, linked data, and 
machine learning when searching, analysing and reusing legal texts to elaborate new 
ones. For example, using ConstituteProject,
4
 constitution makers can now browse 
nearly 200 constitutions across the world (tagged with more than 300 topical labels) 
when drafting their own. Global laws are also accessible to law proponents or drafters 
with services offered, among others, by the World Legal Information Institute
5
 or 
Global Regulation.
6
  
To date, online platforms have focused on improving and facilitating mass partici-
pation (or at least to include larger numbers of citizens in a political process). Those 
efforts have proved useful when supporting the participation of dozens, hundreds or, 
in some cases, thousands of people contributing to an initiative with arguments or 
comments. Yet, the issue of effectively enabling large-scale, massive participation 
(that is, hundreds of thousands or even millions of people) is still unresolved.  
It is also important to note here the implicit assumption that correlates higher par-
ticipation with higher legitimacy. Mexico City, to use our previous example, has al-
most 9 million inhabitants, but what is the threshold for establishing that a constitu-
tion crowdsourced from a negligible percentage of its inhabitants is more legitimate 
than appointing a group of 30 experts? Can future civic technologies really scale up to 
mass participation in elaborating policies and laws, or can legitimacy only be claimed 
when the crowds are requested to ratify them? Would it be better to design systems 
that cater for smaller, decentralised, and distributed (offline and online) citizen as-
                                                          
3http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/articulo/nacion/politica/2017/03/10/corte-admite-
impugnaciones-contra-constitucion-cdmx 
4 http://constituteproject.org 
5 http://wordlii.org 
6 http://www.global-regulation.com 
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semblies (thus supporting a renewed version of democratic representation)?
7
 While 
these questions remain open, the answers also depend on political and institutional 
choices. 
3.2 The Institutional Caveat 
 A second caveat when trying to mitigate democratic trilemmas is that deploying civic 
tools for large-scale participation will not guarantee any real influence on either rule 
making or policy making. As the examples in Iceland and Mexico show, there is no 
way to ensure that embedding participatory components into the process—regardless 
of whether this participation is deliberative or not—will eventually have an impact on 
decision making and, ultimately, will lead to more bottom-up, inclusive decisions.  
Over the last two decades, deliberative democrats have set the conditions, proce-
dures, and standards of deliberative processes. More recently, some of them have 
adopted a ‘systemic’ approach where some institutions will achieve some principles 
while others will achieve others, making the institutional system ‘deliberative’ as a 
whole (Mansbridge et al. 2012). The focus on procedures and standards has also ex-
panded to include the discussion on whether mini-publics (citizen juries, citizen as-
semblies, deliberative polls, etc.) and other institutional innovations should have a 
binding force—aligning the outcomes of deliberation with rule or policy making—or 
have a mere advisory role (e.g. Lafont 2015). The debate highlights the underlying 
tensions between participation and deliberation, but it does so from an abstract per-
spective. Ironically enough, the discussion on the optimal institutional design to coor-
dinate and translate deliberative outputs at the micro level into aligned policy making 
is not institutionally anchored. Yet, without such anchoring, it is hard to predict in 
which particular institutional contexts the new designs will either thrive or languish, 
and which trade-offs will be required. Empirical studies focusing on the institutional 
level, such as the Utrecht experiment below, may help to shed some light: 
 
The key feature of this process of political innovation is that citizens were randomly selected 
to participate, they received remuneration for their participation and they could be regarded 
as an alternative form of citizen representation. In contrast with many other forms of partici-
pation such as citizen panels, the advice was not ‘free’: local government had committed be-
forehand to follow this advice and to translate it to an energy policy plan. Our empirical 
analysis of this case shows that an interplay between idealist and realist logics explains why 
they are ‘accepted’ by the institutionalized democratic system.” (Meijer et al. 2016: 21). 
 
                                                          
7 We also find examples of this option in Buenos Aires, British Columbia, or Ireland. The 
Swiss ‘semi-direct democracy’ model (Cormon 2015) is paradigmatic when combining repre-
sentation and popular sovereignty at the three levels of governance (federal, cantonal and mu-
nicipal). Approximately four times a year, voting occurs over various issues: federal popular 
initiatives (constitutional reforms), policies, and election of representatives. Federal, cantonal 
and municipal issues are polled simultaneously, and the majority of votes are cast by mail.  
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An intermediate, meso-level approach to both online and offline innovations would 
help to elucidate the interactions between people, technology, and data in particular 
settings. It would also provide a framework of analysis to better understand both the 
emerging properties (and tensions) of these interactions. We have denominated this 
approach ‘linked democracy’ (Poblet et al. forthcoming).  
4 A Proposal for a Meso-level Approach: Some Features 
Our proposal consists of analysing political ecosystems where clusters of institutions 
are distributed throughout with different roles and specialisations, but all connected 
together. Both the Mexican and Icelandic cases can be analysed through these lenses, 
as well as, for example, the connected interactions between people, technology and 
data in a public health ecosystem (e.g. Casanovas et al. 2017).   
 
 
Fig. 3. An ecosystem of linked institutions8 
It is out of the scope of this paper to present a case study embedded in this meso-level 
approach. Nevertheless, our proposal here includes considering the features that may 
guide such an analysis from the perspective of a linked democracy theory. Thus, our 
analysis of political ecosystems will consider them as:  
 Contextual. Interactions between people, technologies, and data occur at specific 
settings. People are identifiable individuals or groups, geographically bounded or 
connected online (or both); technologies include specific devices and tools (plat-
forms, apps, sensors, etc.); data comprises particular datasets with different formats 
(open data, linked open data, etc.) and licenses of use. 
                                                          
8 In Figure 3 we use icons from the Noun Project (https://thenounproject.com/): group icon by 
Gregor Cresnar; data icon by IcoDots; mobile device icon by Vildana. 
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 Distributed. Political ecosystems are distributed networks with multiple nodes (as 
opposed to centralised or decentralised systems). The level of connectivity is not a 
given and requires analysis and measurement. Most likely, different political eco-
systems will exhibit different connectivity maps—or political ‘connectomes’, to 
borrow an emerging concept from the neurosciences (Seung 2013).    
 Open ended. Political ecosystems will evolve and adapt as the context changes. 
Stakeholders and their interests are not stable, technologies change rapidly and data 
has been characterised with the 4 Vs (volume, velocity, variety, and veracity). If 
any, a theory of linked democracy is a theory of adaptive complex systems.  
 Reusable. Political ecosystems produce collective knowledge. Both deliberation 
and epistemic democracy approaches assume the need to find and reuse this 
knowledge. Ober (2008, 2015) adds to this the dimension of problem solving, in 
the sense that untapped knowledge can only be ‘discovered’ in relation to a par-
ticular political issue, by making a connection of relevance between that 
knowledge and the issue at hand. We are interested in discovering how those con-
nections are made and how they can be reused. 
5 Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we have briefly sketched some tensions and trilemmas in democratic 
theory that are relevant to the topic of designing civic technologies for democracy. 
Our contention is that technology can provide solutions to these tensions and trilem-
mas if we embed the issues at stake in a particular institutional meso-level. 
Most online platforms focus on facilitating engagement and specially participation. 
As we have seen, it is not possible to scale up participation by mere technological 
prowess. Developing technological platforms in the near future will require an inte-
grated approach where trade-offs between political values are explicitly acknowl-
edged and the institutional design of the different components and processes is coher-
ent with contextual constraints and changing environments. Civic values are also 
critical, and we agree with the perspective of Shannon Vallor (2017) when she states 
that ‘the designs of such platforms have assumed civic virtues as inputs, rather than 
helping to cultivate them—virtues like integrity, courage, empathy, perspective, be-
nevolence, and respect for truth necessary to fuel any democratic technology, analog 
or digital’. A theory of linked democracy is proposed to pay attention to these differ-
ent dimensions. 
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